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I.

This

is

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

a successive, capital post-conviction case raising the question 0f whether

constitutional to execute

someone Who was under

it is

the age of twenty-one at the time of the

offense.

The course 0f the proceedings below began on March
Hairston ﬁled his original petition for post-conviction

relief.

16,

2018,

See R.

6.

when Appellant James
In the petition, Mr.

Hairston’s ﬁrst ground for relief was that his death sentence violated the cruel-and-unusual-

punishment clauses of the United States and Idaho Constitutions because
crimes that were committed

when he was only

it

was imposed
R. 8—23.

for

The

second ground alleged that Mr. Hairston’s death sentence was unconstitutional because the

trial

court failed to give adequate consideration to the mitigating factors that must be taken into

account with youthﬁJI defendants. R. 23—26.

On May 4,
amended petition

2018, Mr. Hairston submitted a motion t0 amend his petition, along with the

itself.

R. 257—703; 714—20. The

amended petition

raised the

same claims, but

included additional evidentiary support for Mr. Hairston’s assertion that Idaho had evolved

beyond the
State

practice 0f sentencing adolescent defendants.1 R. 257—703.

moved

for

summary

dismissal of the petition. R. 728—36.

0n October 29, 2018. At the hearing, the

district court

As he

2018, the

A hearing was held in the case

granted Mr. Hairston’s motion to

the petition and took judicial notice of all of his exhibits. Tr. 10—1

1

On May 30,

1,

amend

13.

did below, Mr. Hairston Will at times refer t0 under—twenty-one individuals as “young”

and “adolescent” defendants.

On December

17,

2018, the

district court

denied the petition for post—conviction relief

and entered judgment the same day. R. 761—87. Mr. Hairston ﬁled a timely notice of appeal on
January

8,

2019. R. 789—94.

ISSUES PRESENTED

II.

The

issues presented

are:

Whether Mr. Hairston’s death sentence

A.
twenty-one

on appeal

at the

was under

is

unconstitutional because he

is

unconstitutional because the mitigating

time of the offense.

Whether Mr. Hairston’s death sentence

B.

ON APPEAL

factors associated With his youth

were not given proper consideration.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

III.

In the post-conviction context, the Court “exercises free review over questions of law,”

Which includes

“[t]he constitutionality 0f Idaho’s capital sentencing scheme.”

149 Idaho 130, 132 (2010).2

Summary

applicant’s evidence has raised

applicant’s favor,

would

disposition 0f a petition “is permissible only

n0 genuine issue 0f material

entitle the applicant to the relief requested.” State

most favorable

t0 the petitioner,

petitioner t0 relief if accepted as true.”

State did not dispute

2

In this brief,

any of the

all internal

unless otherwise noted.

facts

Dunlap

v.

State,

When the

trial

v.

Payne, 146 Idaho

court and must review

and determine Whether they would

State,

v.

fact that, if resolved in the

548, 561 (2008). Thus, “this Court applies the same standard as the
the facts in a light

Rhoades

entitle

159 Idaho 280, 295 (2015). Here, the

upon which Mr. Hairston

relied in his petition. See R.

quotation marks and citations are omitted, and

all

emphasis

is

725—

added

36; Tr. 14—18, 24—25. For that reason,

and because Mr. Hairston’s allegations are supported by

the substantial evidence discussed below, the factual assertions in his petition “must be regarded

as true”

on appeal. Ridgley

v.

Idaho 671, 675 (2010).

State, 148

ARGUMENT

IV.

Mr. Hairston asserted two claims below:
his death sentence categorically unlawful;

and

(1) that his

turn.

committed reversible error

in

at the

time of the offense renders

(2) that the sentencing court did not

mitigating circumstances associated with that age

district court

age

when the

weigh the

death penalty was imposed. The

denying both claims. Mr. Hairston addresses each in

3

A.

Mr. Hairston’s death sentence

is

unconstitutional because he

was under

twenty-one at the time 0f the offense.
Mr. Hairston’s ﬁrst claim

is

that his death sentence runs afoul

0f the cruel-and-unusual

punishment clauses of the United States and Idaho Constitutions because
offenses committed

Idaho Const, Art.

I,

When he was under the
§

it

was handed down

for

See U.S. Const., Ams. VIII, XIV;

6.4

3

Mr. Hairston reserves the right t0 respond in his reply brief t0 any arguments raised by the State
for afﬁrmance that were not relied upon by the district court. Because Mr. Hairston does not
currently know what arguments the State will make in that regard, he does not address them here.
4

With respect

Mr. Hairston argues that if the
U.S. Constitution is deemed not to protect the asserted right, the parallel provision of the Idaho
Constitution is broader and still does. See State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748 (1988) (“[I]n
interpreting provisions of our constitution that are similar to those of the federal constitution we
are free to extend protections under our constitution beyond those granted by the United States
Supreme Court under the federal constitution”).
to

any reference

to the Idaho Constitution herein,

The claim has two
standards; and (2) that

parts: (1) that the sentence is inconsistent

it is

with national evolving

inconsistent with Idaho evolving standards.

Each

up

will be taken

separately below.

National Evolving Standards

1.

The discussion of the
begin With Roper

v.

ﬁrst element of Claim

One—national evolving standards—must

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). There, the Supreme Court held

unconstitutional to impose the death penalty 0n a defendant
the time 0f his offense. See

See Thompson

v.

slightly

568.

The Court had previously

Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988)

standards 0f decency

defendants

id. at

show

that the

Who was under the

at

age sixteen.

(plurality 0p.). National evolving

who were under twenty-one when they committed their
at the

it is

age of eighteen

set the cut-off at

same prohibition should be extended

more than

that

again, this time to

crimes.5 Mr. Hairston

was

time 0f his offenses, see R. 3 16, and he

should accordingly be relieved of his unconstitutional death sentence.6

The ﬁndings 0f professionals

in the medical

and scientiﬁc communities inform the

inquiry into whether evolving standards of decency preclude capital punishment for certain types

0f offenders. See Hall

5

v.

Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 710 (2014).

Roper designated eighteen

In the interest of economy, Mr. Hairston Will refrain at times from phrases like

committed

their crimes.”

When this brief refers to the

noted—referring to the age of the defendant

at the

age of a defendant,

it

as a

“When they

is—unless otherwise

time the offense took place.

6

Because Mr. Hairston himself was nineteen, the Court need only extend Roper by two years
grant him relief. If the Court is not prepared to adopt the twenty-one cutoff urged here, Mr.
Hairston respectfully requests that

it

hold that

nineteen or younger at the time of the offense.

it is

unconstitutional t0 execute anyone

to

Who was

bright-line rule prior to modern research producing a more comprehensive understanding of the
maturation in those ages eighteen to twenty-one. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a
Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 Fordham L. Rev.
641, 653 (2016). As explained in an affidavit from Laurence Steinberg, Ph.D., that was
presented below, the new, emerging medical and scientific consensus across the country, based
on recent studies of brain development in eighteen to twenty-one year olds, is that defendants
twenty-one and younger are just as deserving of constitutional protection from the death penalty
as are defendants eighteen and younger. See R. 292–311; see also Pike v. Gross, --- F.3d ---,
2019 WL 3955846, at *9 (6th Cir. 2019) (Stranch, J., concurring) (observing that “[r]ecent
research in neuroscience and developmental psychology indicates that individuals between the
ages of 18 and 21 share many of [the] same characteristics” as minors for Roper purposes).
A developmental psychologist specializing in adolescence, Dr. Steinberg described the
emerging scientific consensus that “many aspects of psychological and neurobiological
immaturity characteristic of early adolescents and middle adolescents are also characteristic of
late adolescents.” R. 296. As a result, he concluded that the science “does not support the
bright-line boundary that is observed in criminal law under which 18-year-olds are categorically
deemed to be adults.” R. 296. It follows from the undisputed facts set forth in Dr. Steinberg’s
report that Roper “should be extended to late adolescents.” R. 296. Dr. Steinberg’s position is
based on research establishing that “brain maturation continues into late adolescence and early
adulthood,” a principle that “has become widely accepted among neuroscientists.” R. 298.
Consequently, in the late teen years, individuals are more attentive to rewards but less able to
5

control themselves, plan ahead, and weigh costs and benefits. R. 304. For people in that age
range, “the attractiveness of immediate rewards often overwhelms their ability to regulate their
emotions and impulses.” R. 304.
As Dr. Steinberg notes, “[s]tudies of structural and functional development of the brain”
track the same phenomenon. R. 305. In particular, the maturation of the connections that
“govern self-regulation” does not end at the age of twenty-one. R. 305. Experiments conducted
by Dr. Steinberg and his peers have confirmed the point. R. 306. Finally, the late-adolescent
brain has greater plasticity than the adult brain, meaning that nineteen-year-olds have “continued
capacity for behavioral change” and the vast majority of them “age out of crime,” including
those who have committed violent offenses. R. 306–07. In addition to neuroscience, Dr.
Steinberg’s opinion is also founded on psychological studies. R. 299–303. Such studies have
proven that adolescents take more risks than adults, have worse impulse control, and are more
susceptible to pressure from others. R. 299–303.
Dr. Steinberg’s report is replete with exhaustive citations to the leading scientific
literature. R. 295–307. And it comes from one of the preeminent authorities in the field,
someone who has been repeatedly invoked by the U.S. Supreme Court in this area of law. See
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. Neither the State nor
the district court questioned the correctness of Dr. Steinberg’s report. See R. 725–36, 761–85;
Tr. 14–18, 24–25. Accordingly, the report must now be taken as true, see Ridgley, 148 Idaho at
675, and it forms a powerful piece of evidence in favor of Mr. Hairston’s claim.

6

Apart from the medical and scientiﬁc communities, legal institutions and society as a

whole now recognize

that the brains in those

eighteen—sufﬁciently immature such that

under twenty-one years 01d are—like those under

all

individuals under twenty-one are undeserving 0f

death sentences. This part 0f the analysis takes into account state laws as well as decisions by
juries, appellate courts,

and governors. See Roper, 543 U.S.

at

563—65; Atkins

v.

Virginia,

536

U.S. 304, 3 13—17 (2002). “Statistics about the number of executions” are also relevant.

Kennedy

v.

Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 433 (2008).

Considering

all

of these sources, there

is

a strong trend

away

ﬁom executing defendants

twenty-one and younger.
First,

District

n0 such individual would be executed

of Columbia, as

all

for

any offense

The twenty-one

twenty—ﬁve

states

and the

0f those jurisdictions have either abolished the death penalty7 0r have

suspended executions through moratoria.8 See Hall, 572 U.S.

7

in

at

716 (including

states that

have

have abolished the death penalty are Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia,
Washington. and Wisconsin. See R. 339; see also State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 633—37, 642
(Wash. 201 8) (declaring Washington’s death penalty unconstitutional and converting every death
sentence in the state to life imprisonment); H.B. 455, 2019 Gen. CL, 166th Sess. (N.H. 2019).
states that

8

The four states with moratoria are California, Colorado, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. See
Governor Gavin Newsom, Executive Order N—09-19, March 13, 2019, available at
https://perma.cc/4WGM-NXO2; Governor John W. Hickenlooper, Executive Order D-2013-006,
May 22, 2013, available at https://perma.cc/94KD-SYZU; Governor John Kitzhaber, Executive
Order, November 22, 201 1, available at https://perma.cc/PAU8-SBTP; Governor Tom Wolf,

Memorandum

0f Moratorium, February

13,

2015, available

at

https://perma.cc/NLG5-902K.

See R. 340. The website perma.cc allows the user to freeze a website for perpetuity in its present
version With a constant address. Mr. Hairston uses the service here t0 guarantee that the cited
websites are not altered or destroyed during the

litigation.

7

abolished and that have moratoria on the anti-death “side 0f the ledger” while determining

whether capital punishment

was sentenced

is

allowed for a particular class 0f defendants). Since Mr. Hairston

t0 death in 1996, see R. 326, nine states

none have reinstated

it.

have abolished the death penalty and

See State by State, Death Penalty Info.

Ctr.,

https://deathpena1tvinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-bv-state (last Visited

This

is

a reﬂection of the fact that the

away from

momentum

Aug. 26, 2019).9

moving overwhelmingly

is

in

one direction—

the death penalty.

Second, the Court should consider the states that technically allow for twenty-one-yearold defendants t0 get death sentences but d0 not in reality impose or carry out such sentences.

See Graham

v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 66767 (2010); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. Again, that data

favors an extension of Roper.

Of the

begin, three of those states do not have a single under-twenty-one defendant 0n their

death rows:

Wyoming, Montana, and Utah. See R.

those states has executed

9

have the death penalty 0n the books and n0 moratoria, seven have

abandoned the practice 0f executing anyone under the age of twenty-one.

effectively

T0

states that

341. In terms of executions, only one 0f

someone under twenty-one

in the

modern era—Utah—and

that

In 201 5, Nebraska’s state legislature voted in favor 0f eliminating the death penalty, but due to

a referendum the

bill

“never went into effect,” State

does not count in the analysis. Even

if it did,

overwhelmingly in the direction of life.

v.

Jenkins, 303 Neb. 676, 711 (2019), so

though, the

momentum would

still

be

it

execution took place in 1992. See R. 341. These three states can be added to the pro-life
column.
So too can four other states which, although they continue to have under-twenty-one
defendants on death row, are plainly moving in the opposite direction. That trend is apparent
both in terms of how much the states have drifted away from executions and in terms of how
long it has been since any of them have sentenced a young defendant to death. Kansas has not
executed anyone since 1965. See R. 341. Of its current death-row inmates, only one was under
twenty-one and he was sentenced in 2000. See R. 341. In Nebraska, there have not been any
executions since 1997, there has not been a young defendant executed since 1996, and the only
under-twenty-one inmate on its death row was sentenced in 2002. See R. at 342. Kentucky’s
death row is thirty-five inmates strong—only two of them were under twenty-one, and the more
recent of those to receive his sentence got it all the way back in 1989. See R. 342. Finally, as
discussed in much greater detail below, Idaho has moved definitively away from adolescent
death sentences. See infra at Part IV.A.2. In sum, these four states are no longer giving death
sentences to younger defendants or executing them, along with the other three that lack any
young defendants on their death rows at all. All seven of these states accordingly fall on the prolife side of the equation.
Counting both the non-death jurisdictions (twenty-five), and these other jurisdictions that
have abandoned the practice of sentencing younger defendants to death and executing them
(seven), there is a total of thirty-two jurisdictions who do not believe the government should kill
under-twenty-one defendants. The current pattern of states’ use of the death penalty is
9

“remarkably analogous” t0 the patterns invoked by the Supreme Court in Graham t0 rule that
juvenile

life

Michaels,

sentences without parole for non-homicidal offenses are unconstitutional.

A Decent Proposal:

Penalty, 40 N.Y.U. Rev. L.

Exempting Eighteen-

& Soc. Change

t0

Twenly- Year—Olds

From

the

Andrew

Death

139, 171 (2016) (hereinafter “Michaels”). In Roper,

a total 0f thirty states was found sufﬁcient to justify a ruling banning death for defendants below
the age 0f eighteen. See 543 U.S. at 564. Accordingly, the

same

result is

now required for those

just one t0 three years older.

Even taking

into account the states that are

still

sentencing those under twenty-one to

death, the result remains the same. Across the country, there has

sentences. See

David McCord

& Talia Roitberg Harmon, Lethal Rejection: An Empirical

Analysis 0fthe Astonishing Plunge

Furman Peak,

81 Alb. L. Rev.

been a precipitous drop in such

1,

in

Death Sentences

in the

United States

33—34 (2017—2018) (ﬁnding

From

Their Post—

that “death sentences for

defendants aged 18 to 20 as a percentage of all death sentences declined from 15.2% in 1994 t0

12.7%

in

2004

to

4.1%

narrow age group

is

recent years. See

id. at

in 2014”). Indeed, the reduction in death sentences for defendants in that

one of the reasons for the sharp overall reduction in capital punishment over

The reduction

40.

in death sentences for late-adolescent offenders is especially telling

because individuals in that age group are more likely to commit Violent crime. See Erica L.

Smith

& Alexia Cooper, U.S. Dep’t 0f Justice, NCJ 243035, Homicide in the U.S. Known to

Law Enforcement,
201

1,

young

201

1, 1

(2013), available at https://perma.cc/FAR2—ALNL (“From 2002 to

adults ages 18 to

24 had the highest homicide

10

rate

0f any age group

.

.

.

.”).

Statutory developments also help illuminate Whether a particular custom has

our modern civilization. See Roper, 543 U.S.

at

565—66. The age of a defendant

factor in twenty-one of the twenty-nine states that

Because

it is

is

is

offensive t0

a mitigating

have a death penalty on the books. 10

still

unconstitutional t0 execute anyone younger than eighteen, these statutes plainly

reinforce the mitigating signiﬁcance of a defendant

youth

become

who

nineteen. Indeed, under such statutes,

defendant, since if he were

especially mitigating for a

younger he would not be

is

eligible for death at

Apart from the criminal law, other
not have enough maturity t0 be treated as

statutes

all.

conﬁrm

full adults.

do

that under—twenty-one year olds

See Roper, 543 U.S.

at

569 (considering

non-criminal statutes While assessing the evolving standards 0f decency).

Most obviously, American
responsible enough for us to trust

society does not consider a nineteen 0r twenty-year old person

him with

alcohol. See Lorillard

Tobacco C0.

v.

U.S. 525, 589 (2001) (“[E]Very state prohibits the sale of alcohol to those under age 21
In the

same

vein, such individuals are generally not allowed to purchase a handgun,

casino, obtain a credit card

10

See Ala. Code

Cal. Penal

Code

§ 921.141(7)(g);

§

on

their

own, or—in

13A-5-51(7); Ariz. Rev.

§ 190.3(i); C010.

Kan.

Stat.

Ann.

Rev.

Stat.

states

Stat. §

Ann.

§ 21-6625(a)(7);

where

it is

533

Reilly,

.

.

.

.”).

gamble

in a

now legal—buy marijuana.

13-751(G)(5); Ark.

Code Ann.

§ 5-4-605(4);

§ 18-1.3.1201(4)(a); Fla. Stat. Ann.

Ky. Rev.

Stat.

Ann.

§ 532.025(2)(b)(8); La. C.

§ 99-19-101(6)(g); M0. Ann. Stat. § 565.032.3(7); Neb.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 29-2523(2)(d); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.035(6); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A2000(f)(7); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(B)(4); 42 Pa. Stat. § 971 I(e)(4); S.C. Code Ann.

Cr. P. Art. 905.5(f); Miss.

Code Ann.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204G)(7); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(4)(e); Va.
Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(B)(V); Rev. Code Wash. § 10.95.0700); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2§ 16-3-20(C)(b)(7);

102(j)(vii).
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See 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), (c)(1) (establishing a minimum age of twenty-one for purchasing a
handgun from a licensed dealer); Lisa Boikess, Note, The Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act of 2006: The Pitfalls of Prohibition, 12 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 151, 177
n.161 (2008) (“[M]ost states require gamblers in a casino to be 21 years old.”); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1637(c)(8), 1637(p) (obligating those under the age of twenty-one to have an older co-signer in
order to obtain a credit card); Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile Become an
Adult? Implications for Law and Policy, 88 Temp. L. Rev. 769, 778 (2016) (noting that “the age
of purchase” for marijuana “has uniformly been set at twenty-one”). Federal immigration law
even defines “child” for some purposes as someone under twenty-one. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(b)(1), 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). In addition, “[s]everal states have extended foster care services
from the age of eighteen to the age of twenty-one at the behest of Congress.” Michaels, supra, at
154.
Even some of the lines the law previously drew at eighteen are now being moved to
twenty-one. For example, “as of 2016, all fifty states and the District of Columbia recognized
extended age jurisdiction for juvenile courts beyond the age of 18, in comparison to only 35
states in 2003.” Cruz v. United States, No. 3:11-cv-787, 2018 WL 1541898, at *22 (D. Conn.
March 29, 2018). Likewise, “between 2016 and 2018, 5 states and 285 localities raised the age
to buy cigarettes from 18 to 21.” Id. These changes are bringing the country back to its
common-law roots. See NRA v. ATF, 700 F.3d 185, 201 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he term ‘minor’ or
‘infant’—as those terms were historically understood—applied to persons under the age of 21.”).
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A11 of these laws

in

many respects.

the youths

from

show

that

American society regards those under twenty—one

We protect society from their frequently poor decision-making,

their

own

irresponsibility.

Under the same

less culpable than older defendants, as they are

recklessly, impulsively,

Additionally,

logic, those

through no fault of their

as childlike

and

we

protect

under twenty—one are

own more

likely to act

and criminally.

many of America’s

current cultural

indicate an evolving

adulthood. Between 1996 and 2018, the average age at a

understanding 0f what constitutes

full

ﬁrst marriage increased

three years for both

by nearly

norms

men and women.

U.S. Census Bureau,

Census Historical Marital Status Tables, Table MS—Z Estimated Median Age at a First Marriage,
by Sex: I890

t0

Present (Nov. 201 8), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-

series/demo/families/marita1.htm1 (last visited Aug. 26, 20 1 9).

For ﬁnancial aid purposes, a student can be considered his parent’s dependent

until the

age 0f twenty-four. Federal Student Aid, U.S. Department of Education, Dependency Status
(2018), available at https://perma.cc/3F2F-SSGN.
the cut-off to be a dependent

twenty-six

is

Health and

Human

Services,

Under the

on a parent’s health insurance. U.S. Department of

Young Adult Coverage

https://perma.cc/D32H-DO7Z.

federal Affordable Care Act, age

Some of the

(Jan. 2017), available at

largest car rental companies, including Enterprise

and Alamo, will not rent cars t0 those under the age of twenty-one. Enterprise,
https://perma.cc/98ZQ—XTSS; Alamo, available

numerous sources conﬁrm

that defendants

adults. It follows that sentencing

them

who

at

https://perma.cc/3M2A-MJW9. These

are twenty-one

and younger are not

fully

to death is unconstitutionally disproportionate.
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formed

International developments, too, are “instructive for [the] interpretation of the Eighth

Amendment’s

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 575—76;

accord Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982); Coker
n.

1

0

v.

Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596

(1 977).

There

is

a strong and

by deﬁnition a trend against

unambiguous trend against the death penalty worldwide, Which
the execution of defendants in late adolescence as well.

is

By the end

of 201 8, 106 countries had ofﬁcially abolished the death penalty and 142 countries had abolished
it

“in

law or practice.” See Death Sentences and Executions 2018, Amnesty

International, at

48

(2019), available at https://perma.cc/EZZ8—F3TC. That compares to only ﬁfty-six countries that

have retained the death penalty. See

The trend

is

id.

unmistakably downward. In the

last

year for which data

is

available, “the

number of known executions dropped by over 30% and reached the lowest ﬁgure”
decade.

Id. at 7.

The

in the last

vast maj ority 0f executions take place in a tiny minority of countries, and

common with.

they are states that America’s legal system has

little

else in

Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Iraq accounted for

78%

of the world’s executions. See

The

international

community has taken a

the United Nations General

far different

Assembly voted overwhelmingly

Collectively, Iran,

View than these

id.

at 9.

countries. In 2018,

t0 adopt a resolution “calling for a

moratorium on executions With a View to abolishing the death penalty.” Death penalty: global
abolition closer than ever as record

number Ofcountries vote

International, available at https://perma.cc/6LG5-23EE.
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10

end executions, Amnesty

There are three potential rationales for any punishment: “rehabilitation, deterrence, and
retribution.” Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420. Rehabilitation is never “an applicable rationale for the
death penalty,” as an executed offender is deprived of any chance to become rehabilitated. Hall,
572 U.S. at 708–09. On top of that, there is no foundation to “presume that” a defendant “is
incapable of reform even though the stories of other teenage killers, many of whom have been
rehabilitated behind bars, reveal other possibilities.” Pike, 2019 WL 3955846, at *8 & n.1
(Stranch, J., concurring). That leaves retribution and deterrence. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441;
accord Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
“Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose
culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and
immaturity.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. That is the case with individuals who are twenty-one and
younger. See R. 295 (“Over the past two decades, considerable scientific evidence has
accumulated demonstrating that, compared to adults, adolescents are more impulsive, prone to
engage in risky and reckless behavior, motivated more by reward than punishment, and less
oriented to the future and more to the present.”). As explained above, in a multitude of different
ways, society does not treat individuals as adults upon their eighteenth birthdays. See supra at
11–13. Rather, for at least three years thereafter, such individuals continue to show irresponsible
behavior, poor judgment, and impulsivity. See supra at 11–13; R. 300–07. Those same features
diminish their culpability, and mean that the need for retribution does not justify their execution.
See Michaels, supra, at 173 (“With respect to traits that bear upon culpability—including risktaking, temperance, and resistance to peer pressure—eighteen- to twenty-year-olds have been
15

shown to be more similar to juveniles than older adults. These predispositions diminish the
blameworthiness of eighteen- to twenty-year-olds. Just as ‘the case for retribution is not as
strong with a minor as with an adult,’ the case for retribution is not as strong with an eighteen- to
twenty-year-old as with an older adult.” (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571)).
The same holds true for deterrence. “The likelihood that the teenage offender has made
the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so
remote as to be virtually nonexistent.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 572. In fact, “[t]o the extent the
juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the punishment
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a
young person.” Id. That is certainly the case with someone who was nineteen at the time of the
offense. Because their brains are not fully formed, individuals of that age behave rashly. They
do not reflect and thoughtfully consider the consequences of their actions. See R. 300–07.
Deterrence is more than adequately served by life without parole, and the execution of a nineteen
year old is categorically unconstitutional. See Michaels, supra, at 174 (“[T]he psychological and
neurological makeup of eighteen- to twenty-year-olds suggests that they are less likely to be
deterred than older adults. They are less adept at anticipating future consequences than older
adults. They have lower levels of temperance and they are also more likely to engage in risktaking behavior. In addition, the marginal deterrent effect of the death penalty is weak because
life imprisonment is a particularly severe sanction for a young adult.” (footnotes omitted)).
Because the execution of nineteen-year-olds is categorically unconstitutional, Mr.
Hairston is not required to show that he in particular was sufficiently immature at the time of his
16

crime to qualify for the exemption. See Pike, 2019 WL 3955846, at *10 (Stranch, J., concurring)
(“I believe that society’s evolving standards of decency likely do not permit the execution of
individuals who were under 21 at the time of their offense.”). Nevertheless, Mr. Hairston’s
specific circumstances do in fact demonstrate that he is a suitable candidate for the prohibition,
as he demonstrated notably immature conduct around the time of the offense. As discussed in
Dr. Steinberg’s report, there is substantial evidence that Mr. Hairston was a passive follower who
was influenced to engage in crime by older peers; that the murders were impulsive acts; and that
Mr. Hairston’s behavior after the offense “was marked by the sort of reward-focused,
shortsighted, and impetuous actions characteristic of adolescents.” R. 309.
In particular, Dr. Steinberg observed that Mr. Hairston was greatly impacted by two older
men with lengthy criminal records, each of whom played major roles in his criminal conduct. R.
307–08. As Dr. Steinberg references in his report, one of these men felt that calming Mr.
Hairston down after a violent incident “was like dealing with my

son when he had

his heart broken for the first time.” R. 308. The other man drove the vehicle associated with the
Idaho murders and “made the decisions about where and when to travel.” R. 308. Dr. Steinberg
also encountered indications “that the murders committed in Idaho were impulsive acts
committed under emotionally arousing circumstances,” insofar as the defendants planned a
robbery but then committed a murder on the “spur of the moment” “motivated by the prospect of
an immediate reward—cash.” R. 308. Lastly, Dr. Steinberg felt that “Mr. Hairston’s behavior
following the crime” “was marked by the sort of reward-focused, shortsighted, and impetuous
actions characteristic of adolescents.” R. 309. For example, he signed his own name on receipts
17

for items bought with the victims’ credit card, suggesting that “he clearly . . . was more focused
on his purchases than on avoiding apprehension.” R. 309. Mr. Hairston’s purchases likewise
reflected a childlike personality, including “cowboy clothes, remote-control cars, and stereo
equipment.” R. 309. By contrast, Mr. Hairston’s older accomplice “used a false name when
signing credit card slips and refused to permit police to search his car without a search warrant.”
R. 309. He behaved like an adult, while Mr. Hairston acted “like an adolescent.” R. 309.
Thus, Mr. Hairston is especially deserving of a rule protecting those under the age of
twenty-one from the death penalty. Moreover, if the Court rejects the categorical exception for
those under twenty-one, it should still vacate Mr. Hairston’s death sentence based on his own
lack of maturity at the time of the offense.
2.

Evolving Standards in Idaho

There is also Idaho-specific evidence of an emerging agreement within the state that
defendants twenty-one and below are still developing and should not be condemned as beyond
hope. This evidence suggests that even if the Court finds that there is no national consensus
validating Mr. Hairston’s Eighth Amendment claim, there is still an Idaho consensus validating
his claim under the cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause of the state constitution.
As an Eighth Amendment matter, it is well-established that defendants cannot be
sentenced to death when the penalty conflicts with the evolving standards of decency. See, e.g.,
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 435; Roper, 543 U.S. at 560–61; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. The Idaho
Constitution’s cruel-and-unusual-punishments clause uses the same language as the Eighth
Amendment. Compare U.S. Const., Am. VIII, with Idaho Const., Art. I, § 6. In Idaho, the
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“analysis 0f whether a sentence violates Article

Section

I,

6,

Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.” State
201

v.

Draper, 261 P.3d 853, 876 (Idaho

Because the Eighth Amendment compels an evolving-standards approach 0n a national

1).

scale,

has traditionally tracked the U.S.

and because Article

I,

Section 6 contains the same language and applies only to Idaho,

compels the same approach 0n a state-wide
Mr. Hairston was sentenced
present, sentences

were imposed 0n

0f ﬁrst—degree murder and

t0 death

at least

scale.

on November

constitutionally eligible for the death penalty.

at 20.

This

is

14, 1996.

Between

twenty-ﬁve defendants in Idaho

who were under twenty-one

sentenced t0 death. See infra

it

Not a

at the

that date

Who were

and the

convicted

time 0f their offense and were

single one of those defendants

was

compelling evidence that Idaho n0 longer believes an

under-twenty-one defendant should be given up for dead by the legal system.

There are two types of defendants

One

class

Who were under twenty-one and

encompasses defendants who were under twenty-one but older than ﬁfteen and were

sentenced prior to Roper. For during that period,

who was

class of defendants covers those

older and were sentenced after Roper. For

defendant

If the

it

was

unconstitutional t0 execute a defendant

ﬁfteen or younger. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.11

The second

11

eligible for death.

by

then,

who was under eighteen. See Roper, 543

Who were under twenty-one but
it

was

eighteen or

unconstitutional t0 execute a

U.S. at 568.

Court determines that juvenile cases are irrelevant to Mr. Hairston’s claim, he argues in

the alternative that there are

enough eighteen-to-twenty examples (twenty-one)

the evolving standard 0f decency against executing late adolescents in Idaho.
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to demonstrate

Taking these two groups together, the data sample includes twenty-ﬁve defendants and
every one 0f them received a sentence less severe than death. See R. 272—74
therein”; R. 747, 750—52, 754—56, 759.

adolescent defendants

They

offenses.

all

Who were

wind up

And that does

ineligible for the death penalty,

remove them from

Code

because the punishment

if the

is

0n the

§ 19-2515. Nonetheless, the State has

the capital world, even though

been convicted of ﬁrst-degree murder
statistics

not even account for the numerous

charged With ﬁrst—degree murder but then convicted of lesser

table only for ﬁrst—degree murder. See Idaho

elected t0

& exhibits cited

many of them

could likely have

prosecution had so desired. If anything, then, the

here underrepresent the degree t0 Which Idaho has given up on capital punishment for

adolescents.

Signiﬁcantly, eleven Idaho defendants were sentenced to death during the

Which the younger ﬁrst—degree murder convicts were spared. See State
765 (2018),
State

v.

cert.

denied, 139 S. Ct. 1618 (2019); State

v.

(2003); State

v.

v.

Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 557 (2008); State

Fetterly, 137 Idaho 729,

in

Hall, 163 Idaho 744,

Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 405 (2015);

Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 357 (2013) (resentencing); State

362 (2010); State

v.

same period

v.

v.

Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355,

Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 59

730 (2002) (resentencing); R. 577, 585, 590, 61

1.

A11

12

The record in this appeal comprises a public and a sealed volume, both 0f which contain court
documents from Idaho murder cases t0 show the age 0f the defendants. In the public volume,
personal identiﬁers have been redacted pursuant t0 I.R.C.P. 2.6, including days and months for
dates 0f birth. For consistency and ease 0f reference, this brief cites only the public record. If
the Court Wishes t0

conﬁrm any 0f the

statements here about the ages of defendants for

the redactions prevent a precise calculation,

it

Whom

can review the corresponding exhibits in the

sealed record, which have the same numbers.
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ofthese defendants were over twenty-one. R. 543, 550, 563, 571, 579, 580, 591, 601, 608, 615,
619, 622, 623, 626, 633, 634, 637, 641, 645.

The

fact that death sentences in

Idaho are

now

levied exclusively

on defendants older

than twenty-one, and that less harsh sentences are given to younger offenders,
decisions

by a number of different

actors, including prosecutors, judges,

actors reﬂect the sentiments 0f Idaho citizens,

and

all

is

the result 0f

and juries. A11 0f these

0f these decisions therefore reﬂect the

consensus in Idaho that defendants under the age 0f twenty-one not be sentenced t0 death.

Moreover, the consensus covers a broad swath 0f the
the age of twenty-one

Who were

state.

Of the twenty-ﬁve

defendants under

convicted 0f ﬁrst-degree murder and not sentenced t0 death

since Mr. Hairston’s case, a total 0f sixteen different counties are represented.

13

These counties

are dispersed throughout Idaho. See R. 654. Collectively, the counties represent roughly eighty

percent 0f Idaho’s total population. See R. 656. The counties also cover

districts.

Compare Idaho Code

20 and records
district).

§

1-802

et seq. (listing the counties in

cited therein (showing that there

all

each

seven judicial

district),

were under—twenty-one defendants

with supra at

in

each

In short, the agreement that individuals under twenty-one are not mature enough to face

the death penalty

is

an agreement endorsed in

Importantly, this agreement

is

all

corners of the

state.

shared in counties that have readily pursued death

sentences against adult offenders. If one compares the counties where death sentences have been

13

The counties

are

Ada, Bannock, Bingham, Bonner, Bonneville, Boundary, Canyon, Elmore,
Twin Falls, and Washington. See supra

Jefferson, Kootenai, Latah, Madison, Power, Shoshone,
at

20 and records

cited therein.
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imposed since Mr. Hairston’s With the counties
been sentenced

in

Which young ﬁrst—degree murderers have not

to death, there is signiﬁcant overlap.

death sentence in

Ada

Compare Hall, 163 Idaho 744

(reﬂecting a

County); Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386 (same); Payne, 146 Idaho 548 (same);

Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355 (Latah County); Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53 (Bonner County); Fetterly,

137 Idaho 729 (Canyon County); R. 589 (Shawn Smith, in Bonneville County); R. 584, 585 (J.D.
Renfro, in Kootenai County), with R. 347—51, 362—65, 372—78, 391—98, 453—60, 462—68, 477—
83,

491—92, 494—99, 501—02, 504—09, 523—28 (indicating that death sentences were not imposed

0n young

death-eligible defendants

from those same counties). The very same communities

have thereby shown that they are both Willing to seek capital punishment When they
appropriate and unwilling to seek

it

against

young defendants, proving

feel

it is

that adolescent death

sentences are no longer consistent with the state’s values.

Temporally as well, the death sentences demonstrate a steady march away from
executing adolescents. During the relevant time period (November 16, 1996 t0 the present),

under-twenty-one defendants have been given sentences less than death in ﬁfteen different years.
14
See R. 658.
Furthermore, the

life

sentences are quite evenly dispersed over time. If one

considers the years in Which n0 under-twenty-one defendant

murder, none 0f them occur in consecutive years. See

id.

was sentenced

These

life

for ﬁrst—degree

sentences are not the

product of a temporary fad. They are the product of a consistent trend over a long period 0f
time, just as one

14

The

would expect with an evolving standard of decency.

cited exhibit reﬂects

reﬂecting

how

each

new

young defendants With non-death sentences

in a cumulative fashion,

sentence adds to the previous sentences over time.

22

The fact that young defendants were spared the death penalty after Mr. Hairston was
condemned is a reflection of evolving standards of decency rather than of any difference in the
crimes involved. That is underscored by the fact that many of the later defendants’ offenses
involved extreme aggravation that was absent from Mr. Hairston’s own case.
For example, several of the victims in the other cases suffered painful, long deaths. See
State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (2001) (“Williams did not merely participate in the murder
of another human being; he inflicted a protracted beating in which the victim was terrorized and
tortured, and while engaged in this activity, Williams taunted and mocked his victim.”); State v.
Eby, 136 Idaho 534, 536 (Ct. App. 2001) (describing how the victim was beaten to death by
blows to the head “with a baseball bat and with a large wrench”); R. 416 (indicating that the
defendant beat a child to death); R. 454 (showing that the defendant murdered the victim by
kicking him, striking him with rocks, and throwing him off a cliff). By contrast, the victims in
Mr. Hairston’s case were both shot twice in the head in swift succession and both succumbed
from their wounds rapidly. R. 318–19. Additionally, a number of the other defendants had child
victims. R. 354, 381, 416. The victims in Mr. Hairston’s case were adults. See State v.
Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 500–01 (1999). One defendant was found guilty of committing a
murder for hire, see State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 238 (2009), which constitutes an
aggravating factor under state law, see Idaho Code § 19-2515(9)(d). Again, that factor was
absent from Mr. Hairston’s case. Another defendant was convicted of raping and murdering the
victim, see State v. Tapp, 136 Idaho 354, 358 (Ct. App. 2001), while there was never a
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suggestion that any sexual crimes were committed as part of the homicides in Mr. Hairston’s
case.
In short, many young defendants whose cases followed Mr. Hairston’s had serious
aggravation that was not present in his own crime. The common thread of these other cases was
not that their crimes were all less heinous than Mr. Hairston’s. Rather, the common thread was
that they benefitted from Idaho’s growing consensus against executing late adolescents. Mr.
Hairston simply had the misfortune to be sentenced before there was a universal practice in
Idaho of avoiding the death sentence for late adolescents, so his youthfulness did not receive the
decisive weight that it should have.
That is not to say that Mr. Hairston’s crime was devoid of aggravation. Most obviously,
there is the fact that the crime could be considered an “execution-style” murder. Yet other young
defendants were also convicted of such murders and did not receive death sentences. See Booth
v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 614 (2011) (discussing a case in which the defendant shot the victim
“five times using an improvised silencer made out of a plastic soda bottle”); Meister, 148 Idaho
at 238 (involving a case where the defendant accepted $1,000 in exchange for killing the victim,
approached the back entrance of her trailer, and when she opened it shot her “twice, once in the
chest and once in the face”); State v. Brown, 130 Idaho 865, 867–69 (1997) (describing a
defendant who asked the victim for a drink of water and as he obliged shot the victim “once in
the back of the head with a .357 magnum handgun” and then stole various items from him).
It also weighed in favor of a death sentence for Mr. Hairston that there were two victims.
But another young defendant had two victims as well and still got a life sentence. See R. 407–
24

08. And many of the adult defendants in Idaho sentenced to death in the relevant time period
were given that penalty for murdering a single victim, so that circumstance alone cannot be
relied upon here as a distinguishing feature. See Hall, 163 Idaho at 765–66; Abdullah, 158 Idaho
at 405–14; Payne, 146 Idaho at 555–57; Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 58–59; Fetterly, 137 Idaho at
730.
A final aggravating factor in Mr. Hairston’s case was that robbery was committed along
with the murder. See Hairston, 133 Idaho at 509. As before, though, that factor is equally
present in several other cases involving young defendants. See R. 367, 373, 423, 436, 478, 523.
In light of this evidence, there is no basis for assuming that other young defendants are
being protected from the death penalty because their crimes were less aggravated than Mr.
Hairston’s. Instead, youth is their defining feature. Had Mr. Hairston been sentenced after the
evolving standard had solidified, he too would have joined their ranks rather than being sent to
death row.
In summary, Idaho no longer views defendants under the age of twenty-one as so far
beyond hope that they can be exterminated by the State, and the practice is therefore cruel and
unusual under the state and federal constitutions.
3.

The district court committed reversible error in denying Claim 1

The district court’s rejection of the foregoing reasoning was mistaken.
For starters, the district court applied the wrong test to the claim. It employed “a
presumption in favor of the” State, under which it was “obligated to seek an interpretation” that
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foreclosed the aggrieved party’s claims. R. 778. Governed by that standard, relief would only
be appropriate, in the district court’s view, “in clear cases.” R. 778.
The rule utilized by the district court is appropriate when a party is attacking the
constitutionality of a statute or regulation. See Regan v. Denney, 165 Idaho 15, 19, 21–27
(2019); Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 40, 44–48 (2010); Lochsa Falls, LLC v. State, 147 Idaho
232, 237, 240–42 (2009); American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res.,
143 Idaho 862, 869, 872–73 (2007). Mr. Hairston lodged no such attack. For there is no statute
that says late adolescents can be executed. Rather, Idaho simply has a statute that authorizes the
death penalty for defendants convicted of first-degree murder. See Idaho Code § 19-2515. It has
always been the judiciary’s independent duty to determine what categories of defendants are
constitutionally ineligible for death. See Hall, 572 U.S. at 710 (reiterating that the Court “must
express its own independent determination” about what categories of defendants are shielded
from the death penalty by the evolving standard of decency). There is no legislative judgment
under review, and nothing to defer to.
By subjecting Mr. Hairston to a heightened standard, the district court erred. The inquiry
should instead have asked, as in every post-conviction case, whether Mr. Hairston had proven his
allegations “by a preponderance of the evidence.” Marr v. State, 163 Idaho 33, 34 (2017).
Because the district court’s entire analysis was colored by its incorrect frame of reference, a
remand would be salutary for that reason alone, so that the case can be reviewed below through
the right lens. See, e.g., Climax, LLC v. Snake River Oncology of E. Idaho, PLLC, 149 Idaho
791, 798 (2010) (determining that the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong
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legal standard and remanding for it to use the correct one); Robertson v. Richards, 115 Idaho
628, 629 (1987) (similar).
If the Court declines to remand for the trial judge to review the case again with the true
test in hand, it should reverse with instructions to grant relief, or—in the alternative—to hold an
evidentiary hearing.
This is so because, apart from using the incorrect test, the district court’s analysis of the
evidence was fundamentally flawed. In its order on the petition, the district court rightfully
acknowledged that “much of the reasoning and data” behind the prohibition of juvenile death
sentences in Roper “is analogous to the reasoning and data cited in favor of banning the death
penalty as against all young adult defendants in general.” R. 779. It also recognized that “the
statistical samples and scientific and legal data presented by Mr. Hairston were compelling.” R.
781. Even so, the district court went on to make the conclusory statement that Mr. Hairston’s
presentation failed to supply enough evidence of either a national consensus against death
sentences for young adults or an Idaho consensus in the same direction. R. 780. In the district
court’s eyes, while “compelling,” the evidence of a consensus was “still emergent.” R. 781.
The district court’s summary assertions were not supported with any articulated
reasoning or any meaningful engagement with the extensive evidence proffered by Mr. Hairston,
none of which was disputed by the State. And, perhaps more fatally, the assertions are
inconsistent with binding caselaw from the U.S. Supreme Court. As pointed out earlier, there are
more jurisdictions that have moved away from late-adolescent executions than had abandoned
juvenile executions at the time of Roper. See supra at 9–10. It is simply not the case that there
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is insufficient evidence of a national consensus, notwithstanding the district court’s
unsubstantiated ruling to the contrary. The numbers are in and the consensus has fully emerged,
as dictated by Roper.
Nor is it persuasive to say, with the district court, that the evidence is inadequate on the
state-wide front. Since Mr. Hairston’s death sentence was imposed almost a quarter-century ago,
not a single adolescent in Idaho has been given the same punishment, even though dozens have
been convicted of the identical offense around the state, and often under more aggravating
circumstances. See supra at 19–25. If that is not enough evidence of an Idaho consensus, it is
difficult to imagine what would be.
The district court faulted Mr. Hairston for not pointing to any “controlling case holding
what he urges.” R. 781. But it is every court’s responsibility to interpret the cruel-and-unusualpunishment clauses of the state and federal constitutions. See Lanham v. Fleenor, 164 Idaho
355, 360 (2018) (“This function, determining the applicable law, is a bedrock of judicial
decision-making. As Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in the landmark decision Marbury v.
Madison, it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must necessarily expound and interpret that
rule.”). The highest court in the country has declared that the scope of cruel-and-unusualpunishment clauses is set by the evolving standards of decency. See supra at 18. Those
standards are by definition in flux. It follows that every court has an obligation to assess the
state of the consensus at the time it conducts its review. The fact that no higher court has done
so yet was an improper basis to avoid the necessary judicial work that was called for below, and
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it is an improper basis to avoid the necessary judicial work that is called for now. See, e.g., Cruz,
2018 WL 1541898, at *14–25 (extending a similar rule based on new information); State v.
Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 48–82 (Conn. 2015) (declaring the death penalty in Connecticut
unconstitutional after reviewing the practices on the ground both state-wide and around the
country); Josh Gupta-Kagan, The Intersection Between Young Adult Sentencing and Mass
Incarceration, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 669, 682 & nn. 69, 70 (2018) (hereinafter “Gupta-Kagan”)
(recounting a case in which a Kentucky state trial court granted relief on an identical claim).
It was doubly erroneous for the district judge to pin his ruling to an absence of precedent
when the evidence bolstering Mr. Hairston’s claims has never been addressed by this Court or
the U.S. Supreme Court. The question presented in Roper was whether “the imposition of the
death penalty on a person who commits a murder at age seventeen [is] cruel and unusual.”
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2003 WL
26089783, at *i. Since then, neither tribunal has ever taken up the question of whether Roper
should be extended to a slightly older cohort. And certainly neither tribunal has had an
opportunity to consider the substantial new evidence brought forward by Mr. Hairston, most of
which did not exist at the time of Roper. That is obviously true of the legal developments
discussed above. It is also true of the science. As Dr. Steinberg attested: “At the time of Roper
v. Simmons . . . the science of adolescent brain development was still in its early stages, and there
were no systematic studies of brain development that focused specifically on the period between
18 and 21.” R. 299; accord R. 296 (describing how it was “[i]n the past ten years” that
“additional scientific evidence has accrued indicating that many aspects of psychological and
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neurobiological immaturity characteristic of early adolescents and middle adolescents are also
characteristic of late adolescents”); R. 298 (“Further study of brain maturation conducted during
the past decade has revealed that several aspects of brain development affecting judgment and
decision-making are not only ongoing during adolescence, but continue beyond age 20.”). It is
illogical to hold prior cases against Mr. Hairston when those courts did not have his claim or his
evidence before them.
Because Mr. Hairston advanced in the district court a voluminous body of uncontested
evidence proving the merits of Claim 1, he is entitled to relief as a matter of law. See Idaho
Code § 19-4906(c) (allowing Idaho courts to summarily grant relief where the petitioner “is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). This Court should accordingly remand with
instructions for the petition to be granted and the death sentence vacated.
In the event the Court does not do so, a remand for an evidentiary hearing is in order. At
a minimum, the summary denial of relief is unjustified. Accepting all of Mr. Hairston’s
allegations as true, and drawing all inferences “liberally” in his favor, as the Court must,
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004), he has presented a substantial amount of
information to suggest that there is a consensus on a both a national and a state level against
executing adolescents. Those allegations cannot be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.
See, e.g., McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 572 (2010) (remanding a post-conviction case for an
evidentiary hearing); Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 839 (2007) (same). Such a hearing
would be especially beneficial because Dr. Steinberg could explain and elaborate upon his
report, the State could subject his opinion to cross-examination, and the district court could
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render an opinion on this important issue based on the fullest, most comprehensive record
possible. See Cruz, 2018 WL 1541898, at *3 (noting that Dr. Steinberg testified at a similar
hearing in federal district court); Gupta-Kagan, supra, at 682 & nn. 69, 70 (2018) (mentioning
that Dr. Steinberg testified in a Kentucky state trial court before the judge granted relief on an
identical claim). There is at least “a genuine issue of material fact” as to the evolving standards
and “an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.” Dunlap, 159 Idaho at 295.
If the Court is not convinced that either relief or an evidentiary hearing are yet warranted,
it ought to remand for the district judge to take into account the new evidence in support of a
national consensus that was not addressed below. Most significantly, two states have
subsequently abolished the death penalty for all offenses. See H.B. 455, 2019 Gen. Ct., 166th
Sess. (N.H. 2019); Gregory, 427 P.3d at 633–37. Plus, California has declared a moratorium on
executions. See supra at 7 n.8. That development is especially salient because California has the
largest number of death-row inmates in the country by a hefty margin and is by far the most
populous state to boot. See James R. Acker, Snake Oil With a Bite: The Lethal Veneer of Science
and Texas’s Death Penalty, 81 Alb. L. Rev. 751, 751 n.2 (2017–2018) (calculating that
California had 744 prisoners on death row as of Spring 2017, and the next closest state was
Florida, which had only 386); Mirko Bagaric & Peter Isham, A Rational Approach to the Role of
Publicity and Condemnation in the Sentencing of Offenders, 46 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 239, 251 n.54
(2019) (“As of 2017, California was the most populous U.S. state with 39.5 million residents;
Texas ranked second with 28.3 million residents.”). California’s transition into the anti-death
column is a seismic development in the evolving-standards calculus. Assuming this Court is not
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prepared to declare a consensus now, it would be appropriate to send the case back down so the
district judge can look at the much stronger new data and analyze it in the first instance. See
Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 681 (2009) (remanding for the district court to address an issue
in the first instance).
In overview, Mr. Hairston should be granted relief on Claim 1 or, in the alternative, an
evidentiary hearing.
B.

Mr. Hairston’s death sentence is unconstitutional because the mitigating
factors associated with his youth were not given proper consideration.

When by dint of his age a defendant belongs to a group that is categorically less
deserving of a certain punishment, he is constitutionally entitled to probing consideration of the
features associated with youthfulness before he receives that punishment. See Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2016) (holding that a defendant who is under eighteen cannot be
sentenced to life without parole unless there is “[a] hearing where youth and its attendant
characteristics are considered as sentencing factors”). Specifically, the sentencer in such a
situation must consider the following factors:
First, children have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility, leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.
Second, children are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures,
including from their family and peers; they have limited control over their own
environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crimeproducing settings. And third, a child’s character is not as well formed as an
adult’s; his traits are less fixed and his actions less likely to be evidence of
irretrievable depravity.
Id. at 733 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471). The promise of that consideration is heightened in a
capital case, where the defendant also has a constitutional right to present any evidence that
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might weigh in favor of life. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality op.). When the sentencer does not consider these
factors, post-conviction relief must be granted and the prisoner must receive a new penalty
hearing. See Windom v. State, 162 Idaho 417, 424–25 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 977
(2018).
Montgomery dealt with under-eighteen defendants sentenced to life without parole. See
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732. However, Mr. Hairston established above that the eighteen-year
cutoff for capital cases is no longer consistent with the evolving standards of decency. See supra
at Part IV.A. For the same reasons, the Constitution obligates a sentencing court to consider the
special mitigating force of youth before condemning a

boy to die at the State’s

hands. See Cruz, 2018 WL 1541898, at *14–25 (extending the Montgomery rule from
defendants under eighteen to defendants under nineteen); People v. House, --- N.E.3d ---, 2019
WL 2718457, at *12–14 (Ill. Ct. App. 2019) (similar).
That constitutionally required consideration did not take place at Mr. Hairston’s
sentencing. Not a single expert testified for the defense at the penalty phase. See R. 693–703.
By definition, then, there was no consideration of the neurological and psychological evidence
distinguishing late adolescents from older defendants. Although there were sporadic references
by lay witnesses to the fact that Mr. Hairston was, as a child, small for his size and lagging
behind his peers, see R. 696, there was no testimony about any of the Montgomery factors
outlined earlier.
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Furthermore, in the trial court’s fifteen-page written explanation of its sentencing
determination, it conducted only the most perfunctory analysis of Mr. Hairston’s youth as
mitigating. R. 313–27. While the trial court found Mr. Hairston’s age at the offense to be
mitigating, R. 316, it barely addressed the issue. The only comment the Court made that could
even arguably be considered substantive was: “The fact that Mr. Hairston is now only
is indeed troubling to this Court; however, this fact is not a compelling
mitigating factor regarding the circumstances of these murders.” R. 323.
Such cursory statements do not come remotely close to the searching, detailed review of
youth and the specific mitigating effects associated with it that is required under Montgomery,
Miller, and Windom. The sentencing judge certainly did not canvass the various ways in which
Mr. Hairston’s youth counseled against death. Consequently, Mr. Hairston did not receive the
process to which he was entitled, and his sentence is unconstitutional for that reason as well.
The district court denied Mr. Hairston’s second claim for the exact same reasons that it
rejected his first. See R. 783–84. Accordingly, its decision should be reversed for the same
reasons outlined earlier, and Mr. Hairston respectfully requests relief or the alternative remedies
set forth there.
V.
Mr. Hairston was a

CONCLUSION
boy when he committed the acts for which he is

now on death row. As a society, we do not let kids of that age do a host of things, including buy
alcohol, because they tend to be reckless and impulsive. The latest science confirms the same
qualities, and shows that people who are so young have trouble controlling their behavior and
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